As of this writing, there are signs that the war which broke out in Georgia a few days ago is starting to wind down, with Russian President Medvedev suggesting that the Russian Army is not going to push further into Georgian territory. But though the crisis point may be passing, it is important to understand what this war means for the future of international relations in general and US-Russian relations in particular.
First, a quick review: Georgia is a former part of the Soviet Union located in the southern Caucasus region near the Black Sea. When Georgia became independent with the fall of the USSR, two areas of the country, South Ossetia and Abkhazia, felt they had more in common with Russia than with Georgia. Amid the chaos of the early 90s, they were able to wrest de facto autonomy from the weak Georgian state. Both areas are far too small and poor to be viable as independent states, so their real goal is to become part of Russia. Needless to say, Georgia doesn’t like that idea very much. Referendums have been held in these areas but under questionable circumstances – Russian “peacekeepers” have been stationed in the breakway territories at the invitation of the separatist governments there.
The current conflict started when the current President of Georgia, a pro-Western nationalist, decided it was time to try to retake the rebel areas by force. This turned out to be a stupendously bad idea because of the aforesaid Russian “peacekeepers” – though it is now emerging that the Georgians may have been deliberately provoked by the Russian-backed separatists. The Russians easily repelled the assault and inflicted some additional punishment on Georgian territory, threatening to cut the country in half with a tank column. Georgia immediately began begging for a cease-fire.
The conflict has posed a thorny dilemma for the United States. Georgia is a US ally, sent 2,000 troops to Iraq and wants to join NATO. There is no question where US sympathies lie. On the other hand, nobody wants to see US troops in the field against Russian troops – we spent over 40 years trying to avoid that. The US response, backed by other Western countries, was to tell the Russians to get out of Georgia’s sovereign territory and everybody to agree to a cease-fire. This call was ignored by the Russians because they correctly sensed that we had little to back it up with. Georgia then requested that the US assist them in ferrying their troops out of Iraq and back to Georgia to defend their country. The Bush Administration had little choice but to agree since this was part of the original agreement at the time of the Georgian deployment. The Russians weren’t too happy to see their enemy’s troops showing up in American planes, but it did help to reassure the Georgians that the US was not going to stand idly by and watch them get annihilated.
The calculus seems to be that as long as the Russians limited themselves to kicking the Georgians out of the rebel areas, they could act with impunity, but once they began to push into Georgia proper, the Western powers began to speak more sharply. It is a classic game of geopolitical “chicken”, with each side trying to assess how far they can push the other. Russia seems to have decided that trying to occupy Georgia would bring too much of the world into line against them. They are hoping that the military disaster they have inflicted on the small country will force the Georgian President out of power and see him replaced by a government that will be more submissive toward Moscow’s demands.
What does all this mean for the US? The Russians have flexed their muscles and demonstrated that they will not hesitate to use their military to support pro-Russian elements in what they consider to be their sphere of influence – the areas of the old Soviet Empire. We should not be surprised to see similar “peacekeeping” actions in Moldova or to force Ukraine to extend the Russian naval privileges in the Crimea. Given that the US probably would have had to send troops to Georgia if it were a NATO member, I would expect that this war will eliminate any chance that Georgia had of joining NATO, and drastically slow talks with Ukraine, achieving another foreign policy goal of Russia. The US is going to have to demonstrate that our commitments in Iraq and Afghanistan will not prevent us from coming to the aid of our allies, while at the same time avoiding an outright conflict with Russia. How well we succeed will be shown in the choices of Eastern European countries like Poland, Czech Republic, and Ukraine - Will they respond to a more agressive Russia by huddling under the US missile shield, or will they perceive the US as weak and unreliable and start trying to appease the eastern giant?
The whole situation seems more like 1968 that 2008. In that year, Russia took advantage of the US engagement in Vietnam to use military force to crush the “Prague Spring” uprising in Czechoslovakia. While the ideological conflict of the Cold War is gone, Russian geopolitical concerns are the same as they have always been. Russia’s economy is powered by oil, and as long as the price of oil remains high they should be able to pay for future military adventures.
Here’s one take on how the US should proceed. Unfortunately, it doesn’t enlighten much as to how we are supposed to pressure the Russians without the credible threat of military force:
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2008/08/10/AR2008081001870.html